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Abstract
This article discusses the probability of growth of neo-
liberalism in modern China and its implications for Chi-
nese constitutionalism. A China polity under the vision
of a neo-liberal regime engenders problems of prescribing
a legal system and identifying constitutional ethos. The
genesis of this article is a February 21, 2003, symposium
of Chinese neo-liberals, who proer Chinese neo-liberalism
in answer to issues of reforms and Chinese constitutional-
ism. A Chinese neo-liberal constitutional coterie desider-
ates immediate democracy and a governmental model that
mirrors a United States constitutional government, replete
with separation of powers and independent judicial review.
Such urgings are arguably a denial of both the historic-
ity of Western liberalism and China's ontological base in
tradition, being Confucianism. The historic excesses and
abuses of liberalism should serve to frustrate a transplant
of neo-liberal constitutionalism in China.
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I don’t know exactly what democracy is, but we need more of it.
 1 
During the past twenty years, China enacts a wealth of legislation in an attempt to 
keep pace with a rapidly developing economy.
2 China watchers now marvel at on-going 
legal reform and economic development.
3 Despite such progress, a Chinese neo-liberal 
constitutional coterie desiderates immediate democracy and transformation of China’s 
government into a model that mirrors a United States constitutional government, replete 
with separate of powers and independent judicial review.
4
This article discusses the probabilities of a neo-liberal (xin ziyou zhuyi) regime in 
modern China and its implications for Chinese constitutionalism.  In addition, this article 
contemplates a search for a constitutional ethos under the vision of a China polity 
invoking a neo-liberal constitutional regime.
5 The genesis of this article is a February 21, 
2003 symposium of Chinese neo-liberals, xin ziyou, or xin ziyou pai, who offer Chinese 
neo-liberalism in answer to the issues of reform and constitutionalism.
6 “As part of a 
great debate among Chinese intellectuals and thinkers that has been unfolding over the 
past two decades on the question of China's future, the UCLA Asia Institute on February 
21 sponsored a symposium of four noted Chinese ‘neo-Liberals’ who presented their 
1 Anonymous Chinese Student, during protests in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, 1989, available  at 
www.elliottsamazing.com/demo.html. 
2 Peng Yibing, director of the bills Affairs Office, of the 10
th NPC, reports that it is the third straight year 
that the number of bills legislators had submitted exceeded the 1,000-mark, (Xinhua News Agency March 
12, 2003), available at http://www.china-embassy.ch/eng/44402.html. 
3 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Legal System: A Bum Rap?, 1/6/2003, UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, 
available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=2878. 
4 Richard Gunde, Distinguished Chinese Political Activists Discuss Constitutionalism & Political Reform, 
2/2003, UCLA Asian Institute, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=3243. 
5 Id., The panelists refer to themselves as “neo-liberal constitutionalist.” 
6 Id. 
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answers to the question ‘Where does China go now?’.”
7 The Chinese neo-liberals in 
attendance are Liu Junning,
8 Wang Juntao,
9 Yu Haocheng,
10 and Wang Dan.
11  The fact 
that panelists are Chinese neo-liberals is important, because following the end of cold war 
the West perceives China as a hurdle to reconstructing a neo-liberal world order, or new 
global economy.
12  Contrarily, these panelists, who may represent of the future of China, 
fully embrace Chinese neo-liberalism as the proper course for reforms and the future of 
China.  The 1989 tragedy of Tiananmen Square is also a commonality for this Chinese 
neo-liberal coterie that inexplicably links them. 
A Chinese neo-liberal coterie ponders the choices facing China.
13  During the 
symposium, issues of China’s future are subject to a myopic perspective, because of 
exclusivity in a neo-liberal coterie, as opposed to perspectives that are more diverse.  
Assuming Chinese neo-liberal constitutionalism finds its root in Western liberalism; one 
can arguably predict the underlying forces that may drive Chinese neo-liberalism, at least 
in terms of understanding neo-liberal constitutionalism under a proposed Chinese neo-
liberal constitutional regime.  A prospect of neo-liberalism in China calls into the 
question the similarities or dissimilarities between Western liberalism and Chinese neo-
liberalism, which, necessitates grappling with understanding the meaning of neo-
7 Id. 
8 Id., In 1999 Liu Junning he was among the liberal thinkers and writers blacklisted.   
9 Id., Wang Juntao authored the most famous of the movement’s protest poems, The Tiananmen Poems, 
Xiao Lan, (ed.) and (trans.), Beijing Foreign Languages Press (1979), Wang was subsequently sentenced to 
thirteen years in jail.  The fall of the Gang led to his release after seven months. 
10 Id., “Following the 1989 crackdown, Yu was detained for a year and for the next four years was not 
permitted to leave China.”   
11 Id., Wang Dan was one of the student leaders of the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square 
in 1989.  Following the suppression of the demonstrations, he was arrested and sentenced to four years in 
prison.  Subsequent in 1996, he was arrested and convicted of attempting to subvert China's government 
and was sentenced to eleven years in prison.   
12 Scott Burchell, Liberal Internationalism, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Theories of 
International Relations, New York: St. Martin’s Press (1966), at 28-66. 
13 Gunde, supra note 4. 
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liberalism and pragmatic neo-liberalism, or pragmatic economic liberalism, in modern 
China, if not, a China in post-modernity.
14  The article briefly examines a historicity of 
both Western liberalism and neo-liberalism, because neo-liberalism and pragmatic neo-
liberalism, or pragmatic economic liberalism, arguably evolve from classical liberalism.   
Moreover, Western liberalism’s underpinning philosophical foundation likewise 
arguably attributes to problems of its transplant or integration into China’s legal system.  
From Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
15  to H.L.A. (Herbert) Hart (1907-1992),
16 and  other 
jurists and philosophers, one consistently discovers an inherent coercive proclivity in 
liberal democratic constitutionalism.  Although there are several branches and sub-
branches of jurisprudence, especially in American jurisprudence, such as legal realism, 
sociological jurisprudence, critical legal studies, postmodernism, and others, this article 
will focus on three general Western philosophies of law, which are historical 
jurisprudence, legal positivism, and natural law theory,
17 for purposes of contemplating 
jurisprudence for a Chinese neo-liberal regime.  This article directs emphasis towards 
older schools of natural law and positivism, because these theories are still with us and 
14 See Paul Harris, The Birth of the Postmodern, the Rebirth of the Tribe: Contradiction and Change in 
Contemporary New Zealand, University of New Zealand, University of Waikota, Hamilton, New Zealand,   
(“Postmodernity is a ‘purportedly new state of world affairs’ which has been emerging since the 
1960’s  . . .; For some analysts, postmodernity is but the latest phase of capitalism.”), available  at 
http://employees.csbsju.edu/jmakepeace/perspectives2001/Harris2001.jmm.html). 
15  Charles S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland, Chicago: Nelson-Hall (1981), at 37, 
Contrary to juris prudence in modernity, especially positivist, for Grotius, the state was a composite of 
individuals, as oppose to an abstract entity with a personality of its own. 
16 H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983); Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, Vol. 71, No. 4 Harvard Law Review 593 (1958), H.L.A. Hart, a renowned positivist, emphasized 
institutional legitimacy in his approach to legal system.   
17 Harold Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 Yale L.J. 1651, 1651-
1653, (1994). 
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continue to influence the basis of mainstream thinking in contemporary international 
law.
18 
Historic issues of morals and politics are especially keen for China and its 
ontological base in tradition.
19  One questions what significance Chinese neo-liberalism 
attributes to China’s historical particularity, because a failure to attribute any role of 
historical particularity leaves one thinking that attributes of culture, communal 
integration, or in-place societal ethos, play a minim role in modern legal reforms.   
Nonetheless, as always the case of moral and political dilemma surrounding the 
integration of legal systems, the issue ultimately resolves to one of choice for China.  
After all, arguably, a sine qua non of a successful resolve of these competing institutions 
is conflict.    
II. HISTORICITY OF LIBERALISM AND NEO-LIBERALISM 
A. Classical  Liberalism 
Generally, classical liberalism characterizes Western notions of individual liberty, 
limited government, and rule of law, and further, embodies Western values such as 
“profit”, “free-market”, “private property”, and “economic initiative.”
20  Liberalism is a 
political theory of rights that attempts to forge a social theory focusing on establishing the 
equality of all men before law.  A problem of liberalism is that its excesses and abuses 
have historically contributed to various revolutions, anti-clericalism, the rejection of 
legitimate authority, and other such tragedies.  It is an attempt to end the social 
18 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, at 32, 7 rev. ed., (Routledge 
1997). 
19 A. Charles Muller, Essence, Function and Interpenetration Early Chinese Origins and Manifestations,
Vol. 7 Bulletin of Tokyo Gakuen University (1999), available at http://www.human.toyogakuen-
u.ac.jp/~acmuller/articles/tiyung-earlyorigins.htm. 
20 See Michel Therrien, John Paul II’s Use of the Term Neo-Liberalism in Ecclesia in America, Based on a 
paper delivered at the Pontifical College Josephinum April 8, 2000, Action Institute for the Study of 
Religion and Liberty, available at http://www.acton.org/research/pubs/papers/neoliberalism.html. 
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intolerance strife that plagues Europe after the Reformation.  Success of liberalism is 
contingent on establishing a culture founded on idea of a civil liberty secured by a 
doctrine of pluralism.  Its gist in formulating this idea of civil liberty is respect for civil 
liberty and individual human rights.
21 
Western classical liberalism achieves little success in terms of its historic 
manifestations, however.  In France, at the close of the French Revolution (1789-1799),
22 
and in other parts of Europe, liberal ideals are subverted for revolutionary purposes and 
the promotion of moral license on the part of secular humanists.  In time, counter 
deviancies develop in opposition to the original liberal agenda, because they lack 
practical continuity with the elemental principles of classical liberalism.  A French 
Revolution that initially hails itself as the liberal revolution, antithetically, becomes a 
pillar of religious intolerance.
23 
B.  Neo-Liberalism 
In the late nineteenth century, international trade is primarily contingent on liberal 
national legislation, bilateral trade agreements, and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation.  World War I ensues and causes collapse of this earlier trading system, 
and protectionism and currency instability follow in the inter-war period.  In 1944, 
today’s global international economic regulations are founded upon the multilateral 
system created by the Bretton Woods Conference.  Its objectives are two folds: “First, to 
advance the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to international trade,” and, Secondly, 
“to create a global economic framework to minimize the economic conflicts among 
21 Id.
22 Gwynne Lewis, The French Revolution 1787-1799 The People and the French Revolution, available at 
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/History/teaching/french-rev/people.html.   
23 Therrien, supra note 20. 
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nations, which, at least in part, were held to have been responsible for the outbreak of the 
Second World War.”
24  The result of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 is the 
creation of three basic international economic institutions regulating money and trade, 
which are the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”), or (“World Bank”), and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).
25 
In the 1980’s, neo-liberalism emerges with the debt crises in developing 
countries.
26   Neo-liberalism is the name often given to the political-economic 
restructuring or reform program proposed for developing countries by developed country 
economists, IMF, and the World Bank.
27  Neo-liberal reforms are sometimes referred to 
as structural adjustment programs.
28 
Western classical liberalism stems from the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
liberal movements for individual freedom from restrictions by the state on individual 
human, civil, and property rights.  Comparatively, neo-liberalism arguably extends the 
same individual rights to corporations and banks, and moves the rights of property from 
the status of a social right to that of a fundamental right.  The result being that Western 
neo-liberalism treats transnational banks and corporate entities as equal, for instance, to a 
small farmer in China.  While neo-liberalism grants significantly more freedom to 
24 Malanczuk, supra note 18, at 223. 
25 Id. 
26 Russ Kleinbach, Sustainable Development and Neo-Liberalism, Presented at The University Conference, 
Philadelphia University,  The American University in Kyrgyzstan, May 30, 1999 , updated 12/21/2000, 
available at http://faculty.philau.edu/kleinbachr/neo-liberalism.htm. 
27  World Bank Documents, http://www.worldbank.org, The World Bank comprises five institutions: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Development Association; 
International Finance Corporation; Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency; International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, and regional development banks, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank.   
28 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, Vol. XXX, No 4, p. 20 Jan/Feb, 1997, Report on Mexico. 
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corporate entities, a problem of neo-liberalism is that, historically, it does not extend the 
same freedoms to indigents and working people.
29 
The origin of Western neo-liberalism in the 1970’s and 1980’s evolves from the 
IMF and World Bank providing economic assistance to developing countries contingent 
on implementation of neo-liberal reforms.
30   The neo-liberal reforms encompass 
privatization, free markets, de-regulation, austerity, and comparative advantage.
31 
C.  Pragmatic Neo-Liberalism 
Globalization, or the pursuit of a new global economy, results in the need for neo-
liberal policies.  Generally, because of failed neo-liberal reform policies of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, being the IMF and World Bank, economic liberalism is given a new 
nomenclature of pragmatic neo-liberalism.  In this context, pragmatic is an adjective that 
is intended to change the face of neo-liberalism (economic liberalism).   
It is the strategy of the Bretton Woods Institutions to present a kinder and gentler 
image of globalization, or the new global economy, to the world, especially developing 
countries and economies.  The rhetoric of pragmatic neo-liberalism is people-friendly, 
but remains in identity neo-liberalism.
32  Sometime after 1990, the World Bank and the 
IMF adopt this gentler approach, or political rhetoric, because of first decade failures in 
an earlier development philosophy.  In the early 1980s, because of criticisms, from the 
right and left, the Bretton Woods institutions reposition and reinvent themselves as 
29 Kleinbach, supra note 26. 
30 Id.
31 Id.
32  Dickson Eyoh and Richard Sandbrook, Pragmatic Neo-liberalism and Just Development in Africa,
University of Toronto, CIS Working Paper 2001-1, available  at 
www.utoronto.ca/cis/working_papers/2001-1.pdf. 
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champions of the world’s poor.
33  The IMF follows suit, that is, reinvents itself after 
bungling the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis
34 and Mexico crisis.
35  In early 2000, an 
illustrative case occurs when the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
reinvents itself as a friendlier Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (“PRGF”).
36  The 
World Bank IMF initiates effort to build partnerships with recipient governments, non-
governmental organizations (“NGO”), enhance participation of recipient governments in 
the design of adjustment programs, augmentation of human capital, and address problems 
of governance, corruption and human rights.
37 
However, despite these efforts at repositioning and reinventing, there is 
maintenance of elemental principles of a core policy, especially in terms of an American 
consensus,
38   that assumes “adjusting firms, governments, employees, farmers, and 
citizens serve the greater good in general to the exigencies of competition within 
increasingly deregulated and global markets.”
39  The pragmatic extensions of neo-
liberalism, therefore, supplements this core notion, in that, they present neo-liberalism 
with a more human face.
40 
Neo-liberalism is now a pragmatic neo-liberalism representing new policies of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions as pertains to developing economies.  Arguably, the Bretton 
33 Quaker United Nations Office, New York, QUNO Briefing Paper, August 2000, No. 2/00, Convergence 
or Surrender on Development?  The UN and Brentwood Institutions, available  at   
http://www.afsc.org/quno/Resources/BP200008.htm. 
34 Id.
35 See Robert Dahlberg and Marc Uzan, The Future of the Bretton Woods Institutions: The European 
Contribution to the Debate on the New Financial Architecture, American Council on Germany Reinventing 
Bretton Woods Committee, Paris, September 12-13, 2000, Draft Report, available  at 
http://www.dt.tesoro.it/Aree-Docum/Relazioni-/Conferenze/From-Naple/Documents/The-future/Robert-
Dahlberg-an d-Marc-Uzan-.pdf. 
36 Quaker United Nations Office, supra note 33. 
37 Eyoh, supra note 32. 
38 Dahlberg, supra note 35. 
39 Eyoh, supra note 32. 
40 Id.
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Woods Institutions overemphasizes marketing its reform policies, in the purest sense of 
business marketing, as oppose to the marketing philosophy of a less harsh societal 
marketing.
41  The latter necessarily engenders questions of what is in society’s long-term 
best interests, what will produce international social welfare maximization, and whether 
pragmatic neo-liberalists and the Bretton Woods Institutions are marketing what is in 
society’s long-term best interest.    
D. Globalization, Liberalism, and Constitutionalism 
In terms of multilateralism, during the fifth Ministerial Conference of WTO in 
Cancun, 10-14 September 2003, there is a collapse of much-needed trade negotiations, 
because the Cancun conference ends without consensus.
42   The Bretton Woods 
Institutions, and their development policies for developing countries and economies, 
serves as one of many causes nearly bringing a collapse to the Doha Development 
Agenda.  Chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez attributes lack of consensus to members 
remaining entrenched, particularly on the “Singapore issues,”
43 which are issues of trade 
and investment, trade and competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency of 
government procurement.
44 
These “new” or “Singapore” issues, so called because they first entered 
the WTO agenda at the 1996 Singapore ministerial conference, were 
included in 2001 in the agenda of the Doha round of trade talks only after 
tense negotiations between the European Union, which for years has been 
demanding a WTO treaty on foreign investment, and India, which has 
been leading the resistance to an expansion of the role of the WTO.  A 
41 Charles Lamb, Jr., Joseph F. Hair, Jr., and Carl Daniel, Marketing, 6
th ed., South-West Publishing 2000, 
at 9. 
42 WTO News, Summary of 14 September 2003, Day 4: Conference ends without consensus, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minis_e/min03_14sept_e.htm. 
43 Id. 
44 WTO news: 2002 news items, 16 January 2002, International Conference on Financing for Development, 
Statement by Mr. Ouedraogo, WTO Deputy Director-General to the final Preparatory Committee, 14-25 
January 2002, New York, USA, available  at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news02_e/ouedraogo_stat_fin%26dev_conf_e.htm. 
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compromise then pushed a final decision to the Cancun WTO conference.  
According to the Doha ministerial declaration, which has now become the 
subject of differing legal interpretation, “negotiations will take place after 
the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision 
to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of 
negotiations”.
45 
What is important about the “Singapore issues” is a resulting division between 
developed countries and economies, and developing countries and economies.  This 
division is partly attributable to policies in international trade, which are subject to 
influence of the Bretton Woods Institutions, and their policies of neo-liberalism, if not 
pragmatic neo-liberalism.  In addition, there is the problem of cultural divergence that 
results in equally biased cultural perceptions, which ultimately affects, albeit indirectly, 
multilateral negotiations.   
In terms of China, one must understand that China is transitioning to a socialist 
market economy, or more accurately, China is also a developing country and economy 
that is amidst on-going legal reforms and economic development.  In terms of Chinese 
constitutionalism, especially in terms of the political economy of constitutionalism or 
transition economics, one must also understand that Constitutional order will reflect 
economic reforms.
46  For China, the question remains what will be the affect of on-going 
legal reforms, economic development, globalization, and especially the influence, if any, 
of Western liberalism, or one of its modern economic variants, on Chinese 
constitutionalism.  One intimates that a supposed Western universalizing 
cosmopolitanism, or a Western liberal agenda, may well be the primary, if not, one of 
45 C. Rammanohar Reddy, Decision time on Singapore issues at WTO,  The Hindu, Online Edition of 
India’s National Newspaper, Monday, Jul 28, 2003, available  at 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/07/28/stories/2003072803001200.htm. 
46 See Jeffrey Sachs, Wing Thye Woo, and Xiaokai Yang, Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition,
Inframarginal Economics (October 2000), at 12-15, available  at 
http://www.inframarginal.com/column/xkyang/yangs-papers/constitution4.htm.   
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many causes at the root of the division on “Singapore issues,” and equally so, serves as a 
source of policy contentions in Sinic-West relations.  All of which present problems for a 
neo-liberal coterie.   
III. NEO-LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. Chinese  Neo-liberalism  (xin ziyou zhuyi)
A Chinese neo-liberal coterie strongly intimates that neo-liberalism offers the 
best approach to reforms in China.  A summary of their contentions follow. 
1.  China today has but three choices: democracy, totalitarianism, or 
constitutionalism. 
2.  The New Left in China advocates an alternative, but one that in some 
respects seeks to restore what in some eyes were the strengths of the 
Mao, pre-reform era.  It favors a strong state that will act vigorously to 
counter what leftists see as the unacceptable inequalities and injustices 
created by the past twenty years of market-oriented reform.  In short, 
what they advocate is, in Wang Dan’s words, soft totalitarianism. . . .  
The neo-Liberal constitutionalist, by contrast, favor a state that is 
strictly limited and governed by the rule of law.
 
3.  A genuine, viable constitution must have two indispensable features: 
protection of the freedom and rights of citizens, and restriction of the 
power of government.  In fact, the present constitution of the PRC 
places no restrictions on the exercise of governmental power.  This is 
mainly because the CCP opposes separation of powers. . . .  Second, 
the chair of the Central Military Commission (which ultimately 
controls China’s armed forces) is not appointed to a set term, unlike 
the general-secretary of the CCP and the president of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC). . . .  Third, there is no effective method for 
revising the constitution.  Now the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee are empowered to revise the constitution.  But 
such a large body cannot be expected to in effect make its own laws 
unconstitutional. 
4.   To address the inadequacies of the current constitution, Yu advocates 
(1) a fundamental reform of the election system to make it fair and 
open (now the CCP essentially controls the nomination process); (2) 
elimination of references to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, 
and Deng Xiaoping Theory in the preamble of the constitution; (3) 
transformation of the NPC from the “highest organ of the state” into a 
full legislative body, along the lines of the U.S. Senate; and (4) 
creation of an independent judiciary.
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5.  Many of the old guard in China say they favor constitutionalism, but, 
according to Wang Juntao, what they mean by constitutionalism is 
different from what the neo-Liberals mean.  Many of the old elite do 
not support immediate democratization, although they support the rule 
of law. 
6. New  elites  — lawyers, journalists, and so on — play an important role 
by introducing and fostering liberal, Western norms.  Fourth, liberal 
activists take the rule of law as the basis for their strategy for fostering 
constitutional government.   
7.  What is needed now, he argued, is to develop ideas that will persuade 
the Chinese people that the rule of law and constitutionalism will meet 
their needs.
47 
It is difficult to ascertain where a Chinese neo-liberal coterie may fit in China’s 
political environment.  The Chinese neo-liberal coterie politically align themselves with 
the “new elites” of China, which obviously does not include the “new left” (xin zuo pai), 
who, interestingly, are deemed “radicals.”  The language of Chinese interprets the actors 
in China’s political environment as follows.  In mandarin or putonghua (the common 
language),
48  neo-liberals who want change now are also radicals, ji jin pai or ji jin fen zi.
In the opposite corner of China’s political environment, one finds the conservative 
elements of society, the “conservatives,” or bao shou pai, which manifest a “hold it, do 
not change it” sort of philosophy.  Conservatives may also fit under category of “rightist” 
(you pai).  One assumes a neo-liberal coterie will be even farther left of center than the 
“new left” in China’s political environment.  The latter conjecture is important when 
seeking to ascertain constitutional values for neo-liberal constitutionalism, because it, 
ultimately, engenders questions of a sort of metaconstitutional source of order that will 
actually enable a neo-liberal constitution to work in China.
49 
47 Gunde, supra note 4. 
48 Li Dejin and Cheng Meizhen, A Practical Chinese Grammar for Foreigners, Beijing: Sinolingua 4
th ed. 
(1998), at 1. 
49John S. Dryzek, Constitutionalism and its Alternatives, Social and Political Theory Program, Research 
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Prepared for presentation at the 
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One questions how liberalism can portend Western universal values for 
constitutionalism, if the political environment of China positions liberalism farther left of 
center, or extremely far left of conventionalism, than even the “new left” or radicals.  A 
China polity, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”), still perceives liberalism, and its 
intended consequence of Western democracy, as threat to its internal security.
50  In China, 
as recent as March 30, 2003, cyber-dissidents from a group known as the New Youth 
Society are subject to arrest and detention.  Earlier in April of 2001, members of the same 
group are also subject to arrest for posting a manifesto on the Internet pledging to build a 
civil society in China based on democracy and law.
51  The New Youth Society is a 
manifestation of the new vanguard of cyber-democracy,
52 which uses the internet as a 
mechanism for change.  However, in China, dichotomies of internet access remain a 
problem for cyber-democracy and other pro-democracy factions seeking to use the 
internet as means of empowerment, because legal reforms are promulgating laws 
designed to maintain a strong control over access to the Internet for individuals and 
corporations.
53   A problem for liberalism and cyber-democracy are external or 
macroeconomic forces, such as September 11, 2001, geopolitical changes in world 
politics, pro-democracy movements, War on Iraq, and North Korea,
54 and other external 
forces that China perceives as a threat to internal security, which are threats that may 
Social and Political Theory Program Workshop on “Democratic Theory: The Canberra Papers”, 27 March, 
2002, at 2, available at http://socopol.anu.edu.au/pdf-files/democracy_dryzek.pdf. 
50  M.  Ulric  Killion,  China Internet Tax: Issues of Particularism, Liberalization, and Integration,
forthcoming vol. 11 MSU-DCL J. International Law Journal (Summer 2003). 
51  Id., citing Al Santoli, (ed.),China Reform Monitor No. 490, April 1, 2003 
American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, DC, http://www.afpc.org. 
52 Id., citing London, Scott, Teledemocracy vs. Deliberate Democracy: A Comparative Look at the Two 
Model of Public Talk, vol. 3, no. 2 Journal of Interpersonal Computing and Technology, at 33-35 (1995), 
(“Teledemocracy [literally ‘democracy at a distance’], http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/tele.html. 
53 Id., citing Liu Junhai and Timothy L. Fort, Chinese Business and the Internet: The infrastructure for trust,
vol. 35, no. 5 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1545, at 1568 (October 2002). 
54 Id., citing Wang, Jianwei, Tough Road Ahead for China’s Foreign Minister, April 2, 2003, Online Asian 
Times, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ED02Ad01.html.   
13 Killion: China and Neo-liberal Constitutionalism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 200314
affect on-going legal reforms and economic development.  China’s describes a new threat 
to internal security as U.S. neo-imperialism,
55 a name that its polity may see fit to borrow 
in reference to neo-liberalism.   
In China, a badge of neo-imperialism
56   offers little hope for a successful 
transplant of neo-liberalism.  The latter scenario reminds one of a recent article that 
analyzes the U.S. war against Iraq, which reads, “Overwhelming force is 
counterproductive when applied against popular resistance because it inevitably increases 
the very resolve of popular resistance it aims to awe into submission.”
57  Nonetheless, 
despite such political economic gestations, it is the historicism of Western imperialism, 
U.S. inclusive, that serves as one of many sources of contention making Sinic-West 
relations tenuous.  Globalization bears a striking resemblance to historical imperialism, in 
that, it will often creatively manifest itself under the guise of benign intervention or 
commercial relations, such as strategies of economic, technological, and cultural 
domination that either accompany, or serve as alternatives to the acquisition of land.
58 
The identification of neo-liberalism with neo-imperialism offers virtually nil hope for the 
aspirations of a Chinese neo-liberal constitutional coterie. 
  Assuming a political position farther left than even the “new left,” there is little 
prospect for the citizenry or polity to reflect on the tenets of liberalism.  Assuming the 
political position of liberalism in China is akin to radicalism, if not anarchy in terms of a 
China polity, arguably an attempt to transplant liberalism in China’s legal system will not 
55 Id.
56 John Carlos Rowe, Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism: From Revolution to World War II, Oxford, 
Oxford UP (2002), Discounting notions of American exceptionalism, Rowe sees American imperialism as 
developing along lines similar to its eastern Europe counter-part. 
57 Henry C.K. Liu, The War may end the age of the Superpower, Commentary, Online Asia Times, April 5, 
2003, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ED05Ak01.html. 
58 Rowe, supra note 56. 
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fair well.  All of which brings one to the issue of how a country, like China, selects a 
legal system; i.e. positivism, natural law theory, or naturalist,
59  as a mechanism for 
transplanting neo-liberal constitutionalism.  A concomitant issue is the role of culture or 
tradition in the selection and construct of a legal system.   
The nomenclature of neo-liberal also begs the question of whether a Chinese neo-
liberal coterie, implicitly, adopt a more modern nuance of pragmatic neo-liberalism, as 
oppose to Western classical liberalism.  Another question is the extent to which Chinese 
neo-liberalism embodies Western classical liberalism or Western neo-liberalism.  A neo-
liberal coterie urges that the Chinese people must be persuaded that rule of law (fa zhi)
and neo-liberal constitutionalism will address their needs.
60  Given a contention that the 
“new elite” will foster liberal Western norms,
61 one reasonably assumes the panelists 
borrow notions of rule of law and neo-liberalism from Western universalism
62 and norms.   
Assuming liberalism enjoy a political position of radicalism in the political 
environment of China, the concept of legal borrowing
63 may explain the transmutation, as 
oppose to transplant or integration into a legal system, of Western liberalism to notions of 
Chinese liberalism.  In mandarin or putonghua (the common language),
64  the Chinese 
59 Berman, supra note 17. 
60 Gunde, supra note 4. 
61 Id.
62 See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffen, Key Concepts in Post Colonial Studies, London: 
Routledge, 1988, at 235, (Universalism is “the assumption that there are irreducible features of human life 
and experience that exist beyond the constitutive effects of local cultural conditions…a hegemonic view of 
existence by which the experiences, values and expectations of a dominant culture are held to be true for all 
humanity.”). 
63 Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons, eds., The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic 
Development 1960-1995, New York, Oxford University Press (1998), Report and conclusion of study 
prepared for the Asian Development Bank, at 33. 
64 Li Dejin and Cheng Meizhen, A Practical Chinese Grammar for Foreigners, Beijing: Sinolingua 4
th ed. 
(1998), at 1. 
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characters zi you primarily translates into the English words of “liberty” and “freedom,”
65 
and then “liberal,” which may be suggestive of an artificial, as oppose to natural 
transmutation.  The character zi translates into “oneself” or “one’s own.”  The character 
of you translates into “cause,” “reason,” “because of,” or “due to.”  The character (you)
standing alone is a function word constituting an adverb, which is without concrete 
meaning.  However, zi when combined with you produces zi you and results in formation 
of a notional word that has concrete meaning as a noun,
66 in this instance, a concrete 
meaning or etymology of liberal (xin ziyou pai). 
In this respect, one can reasonably deduce that Chinese neo-liberalism is too some 
extent linguistically rooted in Western liberalism.  Although not necessarily importing an 
effective transplant of liberalism itself, the latter lends credence, too some extent, to legal 
borrowing and the dynamics of legal borrowing.
67  Whether cultural borrowing occurs, 
during legal borrowing from an original Western donor country,
68 as a sort of reverse-
cultural assimilation or acculturation, is perhaps a matter of degree and extent. 
Western philosophers, scholars of law, sociology, anthropology, and economics, 
identify three core theories on legal borrowing that address the process of converging law 
and socioeconomic development.  First, there is an evolutionary theory that predicts that 
law develops over time and in interaction with changes in a socioeconomic 
environment.
69  Secondly, there is a cultural theory, which suggest that,  
Law and legal evolution are part of the idiosyncratic historical 
development of a country, and that they are determined by multiple factors, 
65 Zui Xin Han-Ying Ci Dian, Guangdong: Guangdong Shi Jie Tu Shu Chu Ban Gong Si (The New 
Chinese-English Dictionary), (6
th ed.)  2002. 
66 Dejin, supra note 64, at 1-6. 
67 Pistor, supra note 63. 
68 Id., at 34-35 
69 Id., at 34-35, its classic proponents are Adam Smith, Henry Maine, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. 
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including culture, geography, climate, and religion.  Although law is by no 
means static, legal evolution in each country is distinct and will produce 
vastly difference outcomes.  Far from converging over time, legal 
institutions remain different.
70 
Thirdly, there is a utilitarian theory that views law as an instrument to be used to promote 
economic development.  The utilitarian theory assumes that legal change directly affects 
the behavior of economic agents, and thus, subsequently affects economic development.
71 
A problem of the previously mentioned theories is that they are Western models 
and taxonomies, especially the evolutionary theory,
72   and do not account for 
dissimilarities between Western concepts of authority and Sinic concepts of authority 
(Confucianism).
73  In addition, the theories, evolutionary, cultural, and utilitarian, are not 
mutually exclusive, in that different areas may develop along different paths.  While 
some theories may converge in form and substance and lead to similar legal practices 
between nation-states, other theories may be more path dependent and slow to change.
74 
The process of legal borrowing presents a dilemma for Chinese neo-liberalism, 
however.  In 1996, the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”) commissions a 35 year study 
examining the role which legal systems played in six Asian economies, being China, 
India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Taipei, China.
75  The reception of 
Western law by these countries took place in the second half of the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth centuries.
76  Although the contents of substantive economic 
70 Id, at 34-35, This theory is also associated with the theories of Montesquieu.  The concept of Asian 
values that views cultural differences as the cause of Asia’s path to economic success also represents this 
view.   




75 Id., at Foreword. 
76 Id., at 38. 
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laws and legal processes are determined initially by the source of these transplants,
77 the 
influence of the original donor country becomes less important as countries begin to 
borrow from multiple sources.
78  China also makes substantial use of laws and legal 
concepts of various countries with different legal systems,
79  including civil law and 
common law systems.
80  For this reason, one can only assume that Chinese neo-
liberalism proposes the maintenance of a high degree of influence of original donor 
countries, which is typically Western culture.  In this context, Chinese neo-liberalism 
proposes an institutionalization of Western universalism and norms that are antithetic to a 
historicity of legal borrowing in Asiatic nation-states, as the previously mentioned study 
suggest.
81  Moreover, there remains the additional problem of the dynamics of the 
“transplant effect,” which ultimately determines the level and degree of integration of law 
and legal processes into a given culture.
82 
In addition, a problem of Chinese neo-liberalism may be a denial of the dynamics 
of culture.
83  Admittedly, there are those who prescribe a minimal role of culture, or, 
China’s historical particularity, 
84 in on-going legal reforms in China.
85  In this context, 
77 Id., at 40. 
78 Id., at 38. 
79 Id., at Table 3A.6. 
80 Id., at 40. 
81 Id. 
82 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, 
and the Transplant Effect, CID Working Paper No. 39 (March 2000), Law and Development Paper No. 1, 
Working Papers, Center for International Development at Harvard University. 
83 Talbot, Damien, Institutional Dynamics and Localised Inter-firm Relations: The case of Aerospatiale and 
the Toulousian Subcontractors, In European Urban and Regional Studies, July 2000, vol. 3, pp. 223-236, 
available at  http://www.univ-tlse1.fr/lereps/publi/teleload/talbot072000.pdf. 
84 See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason, The Basic Assault on Truth in American 
Law, Oxford Press (1997), at 16, particularism pertains to particularistic multiculturalism, which holds that 
no common culture is possible or even desirable. 
85 See William P. Alford and Chien-Chang Wu, Qing China and the Treatment of Mental Infirmity: A 
Preliminary Sketch in Tribute to Professor William C. Jones, Vol. 2, No. 1, Wash. U.Global Stud.L.Rev.  
187, Winter 2003, at 187-88; See also John S. Dryzek, Constitutionalism and its Alternatives, Social and 
Political Theory Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 
ACT, Prepared for presentation at the Social and Political Theory Program Workshop on “Democratic 
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the dynamics of culture may be the handmaiden of tradition (Confucianism).  Cultural 
determinism posits that cultural values ultimately condition modes of cultural 
relationships; e.g. socioeconomic, polity, and especially legal.
86  In China, cultural 
determinism,
87 arguably, prophesizes entrenched institutional or foundational values; i.e. 
polity, socio-economic, and legal, reflective of a systemic culture, which, in philosophy 
of law (juris prudential)
88  parlance, translates into an ontological base in tradition 
(Confucianism).  Law and the evolution of legal systems are part of the idiosyncratic 
historicity of a nation-state, such as China, and are products of multiple factors, 
especially culture.
89  The conception of social order as historically contingent and 
evolving, which conceptually embodies an ontological Confucianism, may also explain 
this phenomenon.
90  An ontological Confucianism prophesizes a distinctively Sinic 
infrastructure; i.e. polity, socio-economic, and legal, that perhaps constitutes a blend of 
both non-Western and Western models and taxonomies,
91  if not simply distinctive 
Chinese models and taxonomies.
92 
Theory: The Canberra Papers”, 27 March, 2002, at 2, available  at http://socopol.anu.edu.au/pdf-
files/democracy_dryzek.pdf., at footnote 1. 
86 Cultural determinism is, “The conviction that the accumulated knowledge, the organized beliefs, and the 
way of life prescribed by a culture determine not only all other aspects of human cognition and social 
behavior but also the dynamics of the culture itself.  Such a conviction sees culture as an autonomous 
cultural system,” Klaus Krippendorff, A Dictionary of Cybernetics, unpublished report (Feb. 2, 1986), 
available at http://pespmc1.vmb.ac.be/ASC/CULTUR_DETER.html. 
87 Id.
88 Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levitt, eds., Jurisprudence Contemporary Readings, Problems, and 
Narratives, West Publishing (1995), at 5-6, “The linguistic definition of juris prudential is knowledge of or 
skill in law alludes to the enormous scope of its inquiry”.  “Jurisprudence encompasses the study of a legal 
system’s scope, function, methodology, and guiding precepts”. 
89 Pistor, supra note 63, at 35. 
90  R. P. Peerenboom, What’s Wrong with Chinese Rights-Towards a Theory of Rights with Chinese 
Characteristics, 6 Harvard Human Rts. Journal 29, 52 (1993).   
91 Id.
92 Killion, supra note 50. 
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Chinese neo-liberalism, arguably, must ignore the advent and institutional 
dynamics of culture, which involves tradition, or what many deem to be Asian values.
93 
A consideration of constitutional ethos for constitutionalism necessitates consideration of 
culture.  Chinese neo-liberalism arguably predicts an extension of legal borrowing to a 
concept of cultural borrowing, because Chinese neo-liberalism must deny, in its search 
for validity in terms of communal integration,
94 that Confucianism is systemic in modern 
China.   
There are two aspects to the problem of a Confucian culture and Chinese neo-
liberalism.  First, the historicity of Western culture and its Western universalism is 
distinctively different from the historicity of Chinese culture or Confucianism.  China’s 
historical particularity is grounded in 5,000 years or more of Chinese civilization.   
Comparatively, Western culture, in the limiting sense of classical liberalism, is grounded 
in the intellectual history of 18
th century Europe.  Liberalism is a political philosophy 
with intellectual roots in Renaissance humanism that gains considerable momentum as a 
cultural movement after the Reformation.  For challenging social presuppositions of 
medieval Europe, liberal thinkers contend that each human being is a repository of certain 
God-ordained inalienable rights that ought to be safeguarded.
95 
Secondly, in a discourse concerning Chinese constitutionalism, especially 
constitutional ethos, neo-liberalism arguably deserves minimal attention, because its 
origins are a response of Western developed nation-states to the 1978-79 Asian financial 
93  Alice Erh-Soon Tay, Asian Value and the Rule of Law, Jura Gentium: Centre for Philosophy of 
International Law and Global Politics, available  at 
http://dex1.tsd.unifi.it/jg/en/index.htm?surveys/rol/tay.htm. 
94 Dworkin, Ronald M., Liberal Community, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 480 (1989). 
95 Therrien, supra note 20. 
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crisis,
96  and in part, Mexico financial crisis.
97  Such origins of neo-liberalism make 
suspect its roots as a viable source of ethos, as opposed to more indigenous values 
evolving from China’s ontological base in tradition (Confucianism), which are requisite 
for constitutionalism.  Constitutional values are a requisite for constitutionalism.
98 
Comparatively, a problem of Western constitutionalism is that it is a European-American 
concept of relatively recent provenance.
99 
Conversely, Chinese neo-liberals may argue that requisite constitutional ethos will 
emanate from policies in economics and neo-liberalism.  Peerenboom writes, 
Marxism’s emphasis on historical materialism coincides with 
Confucianism’s sensitivity to the particular conditions of society, 
reinforcing the view of rights as contingent.  Even some scholars who 
argue for an expansive theory of human rights based on the commonality 
(gongtongxing) of all people reflect the influence of Marxism in 
maintaining that rights are a product of the particular historical, economic, 
and material conditions of a society.
100 
Nonetheless, a problem of neo-liberalism is that it must dismiss the importance of 
historical particularity, which creates additional problems for neo-liberalism because 
Chinese rights, in the sense of Chinese constitutionalism, are historically contingent.
101 
A core problem for a Chinese neo-liberal constitutional coterie, when facing China’s 
ontological base in tradition (Confucianism), is the construct of a legal system that will 
manifest a genuinely indigenous constitutional ethos for Chinese constitutionalism.   
Rawls contends that a society characterized by reasonable pluralism political stability is 
96 Quaker United Nations Office, supra note 33. 
97 Dahlberg, supra note 35. 
98 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. Legal Educ. 167 (1987). 
99 Wm. Theodore De Bray, The Constitutional Tradition in China, 9 J Chin L 7 (Journal of Chinese Law) 
spring (1995). 
100Peerenboom, supra note 90, at 52, note 8. 
101 Id.
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contingent on gaining the reasoned support of a citizenry who are committed to 
reasonable and conflicting doctrines,
102 and there lies the crux of the problem. 
B.  Chinese Neo-liberalism and Historical Jurisprudence 
We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful 
about what we pretend to be.
103 
Historical jurisprudence (historical school)
104 emanates from one of Lord Coke’s 
greatest contributions to English jurisprudence, which is an identification of fundamental 
law (unwritten constitution) with the common law itself.
105 
Thus Coke's answer to the free monarchists' general theory of government 
and law was -- no theory at all!  He did not deny the validity of King 
James’ version of natural law theory, that law is founded on Reason.  Nor 
did he deny the validity of the King's version of what later came to be 
called legal positivism, that law is founded on Will, the will of the 
sovereign.  He merely shifted the jurisprudential focus from law in general 
to English law, and more especially the English common law, which he 
then defined in historical terms.  His answer to James was History, which 
he saw largely in terms of Tradition and Precedent.  He could get away 
with this just because it was not -- at the time -- a theory, and because 
English monarchists themselves, and above all King James, continually 
insisted that the English precedents -- which they interpreted quite 
differently -- should be respected.  For they, too, felt the need for an 
historical basis for the legitimacy of the monarchy.
106 
Lord Coke's groundbreaking non-theory evolves into the legal philosophy of 
historical jurisprudence.  In many cases of his time, Lord Coke asserts the supremacy of 
the common law courts.  Implicitly, Lord Coke’s historicism advances a theory that 
common law, as a body of principles, concepts, rules, and procedures, originates in a 
remote past, which is, in effect, the fundamental law of the English people (the ancient 
102 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press (1993). 
103 See Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, vol. 42, no. 1, Ohio State Law Journal, 187-207 (1981), 
quotes K. Vonnegut, Mother Night v (1979). 
104 Berman, supra note 17, at 1651-1653. 
105 Id., at 1681. 
106 Id.
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common law) or the unwritten English Constitution, to which other English law is 
subordinate.
107 
Lord Coke’s historicism relies on history not only as a check against the arbitrary 
exercise of power, but also as a guide to determining the limits and channels of political 
and legal authority.
108  Lord Coke’s historicism arguably recognizes preconstitutional 
rules and pursues a sort of state-centered or domestic metaconstitutionalism.
109  In this 
context, preconstitutional rules serve as a normative guide for how constitutions operate, 
and further, emanate in a gradual Burkean fashion, reflecting a complex of social factors, 
especially culture.
110  One source considers preconstitutional rules analogous to lower-
case usage of a constitution, which is commonly used to refer to fundamental 
governmental principles.  Joseph deMaistre writes in reference to British constitution, 
Certainly it has not been made a priori.  Never have statesmen gathered 
together and said: Let us create these powers, balance them in such and 
such a manner, and so on: No one has though this.  The Constitution is the 
work of circumstances, and the number of circumstances is infinite.
111 
The nature, the sources, and the purposes of law are definable in terms of the 
historical experience of the English people.  Coke’s theory of artificial reasoning 
identifies, in at least one of its aspects, with the historical development of national 
tradition, and, more particularly, with the tradition of the English common law.   
Moreover, Coke’s concept of artificial reason is applicable to other types of law, such as, 
107 Berman, supra note 17, at 1686-87. 
108 Id., at 1689. 
109 See Walker, Neil, Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future of Legal 
Authority in Europe, Harvard Law School, Seminar and Workshop on Advanced Issues in Law and Policy 
of the European Union, NAFTA and the WTO, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/99, This paper is 
to be published in G. de Burca and J. Scott (eds), The Changing Constitution of the EU:: From Uniformity 
to Flexibility (Hart Publishing, 2000), available at   
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/991201.html.  
110 Kay, supra note 103, at 187-207. 
111 Id., at 192, citing J. DeMaistre, Essay on the Generative Principles of Political Contributions, in THE 
WORKS OF JOSEPH J. DeMAISTER 147, 152 (J. Lively ed. 1965) (emphasis on original). 
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canon law, Roman law, natural law and divine law, since in such subjects the trained 
expert, the person of learning and experience is better able to understand its inherent 
reason, logic, sense, and purposes.
112 
Coke views legislation within the historical context of the precedents of English 
common law and the historical common law statutes of Parliament, such as the Magna 
Carta.  Coke is not an antiquarian viewing the past in static terms; rather, he perceives 
English law as based on immemorial custom.  It is the understanding of Coke that while 
law in this large sense, that is, legal institutions and legal systems generally, possesses 
both a moral character (its purpose is to do legal justice) and a political character (its 
purpose is to maintain legal order), it also possesses a historical character (its purpose is 
to preserve and develop the legal traditions of the people whose law it is).  It is all-
important that his emphasis on the historical character of law required a certain 
particularization, since the universal characteristics of legal morality and legal politics 
will manifest in quite different ways in different nation-states with different legal 
histories.
113 
In terms of China, an ontological base in tradition (Confucianism) poses an 
imposing barrier for invocation of a new polity, at least in terms of altering its 
quintessential values and culture.  A successful invocation of a Chinese neo-liberal 
regime, reflexive of Western neo-liberalism, is contingent on its successful blending with 
China’s ontological base in tradition.  However, one speculates that an invocation of neo-
liberalism under the auspices of juris prudential in modernity will result in a shock to 
112 Berman, supra note 17, at 1688-1691. 
113 Id., at 1693-94, 1731-32. 
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China’s infrastructure, and ultimately, creates a crisis of irreversible political and 
economic instability.
114 
For China, rational institutions are governmental organizations representing 
public interest, which are associated with Confucianism.
115   The nomenclature or 
characters for institution, zhi du,
116  unlike in the West, enjoys an intrinsic Confucian 
value.  In terms of Western norms, institutions constitute established practices, laws, or 
customs that are a material and persistent element in the life and culture of an organized 
social group.  However, for China, the nomenclature of institution, zhi du, possesses an 
intrinsic Confucian value, which is the English equivalent of more elevated and value-
laden rational institution.
117  It is for this reason, and other reasons, that China’s 
ontological base in tradition and its Confucian values predict foundational morals, and as 
a result, institutions in China are reflexive of Confucian values,
118 or China’s ontological 
base in tradition.  
Historical characteristics of law, which for China represents a traditional Chinese 
jurisprudence that is reflexive of an ontological base in tradition (Confucianism),
119 
allows for a particularization that reflects distinctive Chinese legal morals and legal 
politics, as oppose to Western universalism’s presumption of universal characteristics for 
legal morality and legal politics.  It is also for this reason, and other reasons, that 
historical jurisprudence, arguably, is not a viable legal system for a neo-liberal coterie. 
114 Killion, supra note 50. 
115 Ch’ien Mu, (Qian Mu), Traditional Government in Imperial China A Critical Analysis, Chu-tu Hsueh 
and George O. Totten (transls.), The Chinese University of Hong Kong (1982), at 121. 
116 Dictionary, supra note 64. 
117 Ch’ien Mu, supra note 114. 
118 Killion, supra note 50. 
119 Id. 
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For China, neo-liberalism, or pragmatic neo-liberalism, and Western juris 
prudential in modernity, are not the exclusive or best means for integrating both a check 
against the arbitrary exercise of power and providing for a more independent judiciary.  It 
is arguable that, even without the advent of pragmatic neo-liberalism in China, historical 
jurisprudence in and of itself offers a more viable Western jurisprudence, as oppose to 
juris prudential in modernity, which will serve as both a check against the arbitrary 
exercise of power and provide a jurisprudence allowing for a more independent Chinese 
judiciary. 
C.  Chinese Neo-liberalism and Legal Positivism 
In terms of how best a Chinese neo-liberal regime blends a distinctively different 
non-Western culture with Western jurisprudence,
120 two competing Western theories of 
legal systems, legal positivism and natural law theory,
 121 produce respective theoretical 
or moral advantages, or both.
122  One suspects that natural law theory does not provide a 
proper mechanism for transplanting liberalism in China, because of its’ normative aspects 
and inclinations to search for a moral and political purpose in analyzing and interpreting 
legal norms.
123  In terms of natural law theory, the actions of a Chinese polity, and an 
ontological tradition (Confucianism), challenges and contradicts Western fundamental 
principles of justice.
124  In such instance, China’s ontological base in tradition proposes 
problems for liberalism.   
120 Hayman, supra note 88. 
121 Berman, supra note 17, at 1652. 
122 See Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1961), at 204 – 205; see also H.L.A. 
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Vol. 71, No. 4 Harvard Law Review 593 (1958). 
123 Berman, supra note 17, at 1652. 
124 Id., at 1652. 
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For transplanting liberalism, legal positivism arguably proposes a universal theory 
that is more appealing to a neo-liberal regime,
125  because legal positivism offers a 
viewpoint minimizing the concept of community as instrumental in the enforcement of 
ethics.
126  The collective life of a political community includes its official political acts; 
i.e. legislation, adjudication, enforcement, and other executive governmental functions.
127 
Dworkin writes, “The liberal view of integration I describe takes a limited view of the 
dimensions of a political community’s communal life.”
128 
However, a transplant of liberalism via legal positivism to a Confucian society is 
still, nonetheless, arguably contingent on its ability to respond adequately to the unique 
jurisprudential experiences and needs of a modern Confucian culture.  If modern China 
represents an ontological base in tradition (Confucian values), liberalism fosters new 
problems and conflicts for China and its political community communal life.   
Nonetheless, in terms of Chinese neo-liberalism, legal positivism and its universalism is, 
no doubt, preferably in the construct of a Chinese legal system and constitutionalism.  
 Legal positivism also engenders criticism of being anti-democratic.  Dworkin 
uses the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Bowers vs. Hardwick,
129  to illustrate such 
contention.  “In Bowers,
130 Justice White suggests that the community has a right to use 
the law to support its vision of ethical decency: it has a right to impose its views about 
ethics just because it is the majority.”
131  The problem of morals and politics, which are 
arguably inherent conflicts of positivism, serves as an additional source of criticism, 
125 Id.
126 Dworkin, supra note 94, at 479-80. 
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Dworkin, supra note 94, at 479-80, in Bowers v. Hardwick, (1986) 478 U.S. 186,  the United States 
Supreme Court upholds a Georgia law making sodomy a crime against constitutional challenge. 
130 Id.
131 Id.
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“because mainstream international law positivism in the tradition of Lassa Oppenheim 
(1858-1919) has sought to separate law from morals and from politics, many critics have 
dismissed this positivism as amoral, apolitical, and atheoretical.”
132 
The most current version of legal positivism, without undertaking a historical 
journey of legal positivism, that is, from the imperative positivism of John Austin
133 to 
the legal realism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
134 are the writings of Herbert Hart,
135 
and Hans Kelsen,
136 on normative legal positivism or normative positivist analysis of the 
concept of law.  In particular, the concept of conceiving law as a set of social rules is all-
important to Hart.  On liberalism and legal positivism, Hart writes, 
It is not, I think, uncharitable to say that we can see in his argument that he 
has only half digested the spiritual message of liberalism which he is 
seeking to convey to the legal profession.  For everything that he says is 
really dependent upon an enormous evaluation of the importance of the 
bare fact that a rule may be said to be a valid rule of law, as if this, once 
declared, was conclusive of the final moral question: ‘Ought this rule of 
law to be obeyed?’  Surely the truly liberal answer to any sinister use of 
the slogan ‘law is law’ or of the distinction between law and morals is 
‘Very well, but that does not conclude the question.  Law is not morality; 
do not let it supplant morality.
137 
Hart sees the separation of law and morals as essential to the meaning of legal 
positivism.
138  The ideological underpinning of Hart keeps faith with the insistence of the 
great Utilitarians, Bentham and Austin, “on the separation of law as it is and law as it 
132 See  Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of 
Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, Vol. 13, No. 2 European Journal of 
International Law, at 1, 45.  
133 See Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), Prometheus Books (2000).  
134 See Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., The Path of the Law, Vol. 10 Harvard Law Review 457 – 478 (1897). 
135 See Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1961). 
136 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University 
of California Press (1967). 
137 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Vol. 71, No. 4 Harvard Law Review 
593, 612-21 (1958). 
138 Id.
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ought to be.”
139  In contrast with modern China, a distinguishing feature of this 
philosophical thought is the fact of origins stemming from intellectual architects of great 
reform, or Utilitarians, addressing legal and social problems in England, at the close of 
the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century.
140 
Issues of morality and law are arguably different for China, as opposed to the 
West, especially the United States, and its pluralistic society, because China is a 
comparatively monolithic society with a strongly entrenched ontological base in tradition 
(Confucianism).  In this context, morals and foundational ethos are reflective of a 
systemic Confucianism.  In terms of Chinese constitutional ethos, assuming modern 
Chinese ethos are reflective of an ontological base in tradition (Confucianism), the issue 
may simply resolve into whether what is legally wrong, for instance, according to rule of 
law, is also morally wrong in the sense of Confucianism.  The typical intellectual 
trappings of positivism do not readily dismiss the latter ethical dilemma, because of a 
distinctive Chinese ontology, as compared to the ontology of Western culture and nation-
states. 
A persistent problem with issues in constitutionalism for modern China is a Sinic 
uniqueness that evolves from a Chinese ontology.  It is a problem further exasperated by 
institutional dynamics, in that, Chinese institutions; i.e. polities, socio-economic, and 
legal, are also arguably reflective of a distinctive Chinese ontology (Confucianism).   
Admittedly, the latter contention is necessarily based on an assumption of both the reality 
139 Id., at 594-95. 
140 Id.
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of an ontological base in tradition (Confucianism) and the existence of a genuine 
traditional Chinese jurisprudence.
141 
Antithetically, in terms of ascertaining foundation ethos for Chinese institutions 
and constitutionalism, a neo-liberal coterie may argue that concepts of legal borrowing 
and cultural borrowing present contrary arguments to this idea of Confucianism serving 
as an ontological base for individuals, society, institutions, and especially constitutional 
ethos.  Assuming a past of cultural borrowing, or mono-directional cultural exchange; i.e. 
West to Sinic, an argument based on irredentism is plausible.
142  Moreover, a neo-liberal 
coterie may make a plausible argument that electing legal positivism, as a legal system, is 
not contingent on societal morals.  Philip Soper
 posits that the choice of a legal theory is 
not contingent on moral considerations.
143  Further arguing, a neo-liberal coterie can 
point to the fact Confucianism in and of itself is arguably an unfit source of constitutional 
ethos, because it is a concept somewhat aloft and seemingly notional.
144 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding issues of separability thesis and historic excesses 
and abuses, an inherent problem of liberalism and legal positivism as pertains to a 
Chinese ontology is lack of a meaningful role assigned to political community communal 
life in such a legal system.  Moreover, a minimal assignment of a role to political 
community communal life, in terms of a soft positivism,
145 still, does not alleviate the 
141 David A. Funk, Traditional Chinese Jurisprudence: Justifying Li and Fa, 17 So.  U. L. Rev. 1 (1990). 
142 Irredentism is “a political principle or policy directed toward the incorporation of irredentas within the 
boundaries of their historically or ethnically related political unit.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary. 
143 Philip Soper, Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds, Vol. 4, Issue 1, Social Philosophy and Policy, 
(1987), at 33 – 48. 
144  Wm. Theodore de Bray and & Tu Weiming, (eds.), Confucianism and Human Rights, New York: 
Columbia Press, 1988, at 255, note 10. 
145  Hart's  Concept of Law Lecture 8, 2000, available  at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0013/Hart%20Lecture%208%202001.htm. 
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inherent problems of legal positivism.
146  The search for a source of constitutional ethos 
for liberal constitutional reforms must necessarily focus on legal positivism as the only 
viable legal system, because legal positivism arguably provides a requisite authoritarian 
state for implementing Western rule of law,
147  while also allowing for efficient mono-
directional cultural exchanges that are more capable of responding to a Confucian 
ontology.  Comparatively, natural law theory and its denial of the separability thesis, 
which is essential to legal positivism, poses problems for liberalism, especially in terms 
of constitutional ethos being reflective of a Confucian ontology.  Arguably, an 
ontological Confucianism remains a barrier to mono-directional cultural borrowing when 
in search of Western constitutional values, while, also, providing the only viable source 
of genuinely indigenous constitutional ethos for Chinese constitutionalism.
148 
D.  China Democracy and Western Democracy 
  A Chinese neo-liberal constitutional coterie essentially urges a constitutional 
convention that adopts a discursive model of constitutionalism that exactly mirrors 
American constitutionalism.  The panelists urge a separation of powers and independent 
judiciary that mirrors the in-place governmental model of the United States.
149  Initially, 
the neo-liberal coterie urges a constitutionalism that is seemingly over-simplistic and fails 
to recognize the real inner-workings of Western constitutionalism.  In Western 
jurisprudence, constitutional models diverge on issues of constitutional review versus 
constitutional courts, and centralized constitutional review versus decentralized 
146 Supra notes 125-127, 131, 137-140. 
147 See Pierre Manet, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Princeton University 1996. 
148 Pitkin, supra note 98. 
149 Gunde, supra note 4. 
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constitutional review.
150  Notwithstanding a commonality grounded in the theories and 
philosophies of the intellectual European Enlightenment thinkers, there are contrasting 
models of constitutions and constitutionalism.  The independent judicial review and 
activism of the United States judiciary is actually atypical to Western jurisprudence.   
There are liberal democracies, such as Great Britain, that actually have not had a written 
constitution for a substantial period.  In addition, Great Britain and its parliamentary 
supremacy do not have constitutional provisions on both separation of powers and 
independent judicial review (constitutional review).  Moreover, despite such 
dissimilarities, democracy in Great Britain is no less than that of the U.S.
151 
The panelists also seemingly fail to recognize the shortcomings of the United 
States judicial model, which is a judicial model subject to criticism because of its failings 
in many respects.  One source even proclaims that the problem with America is an excess 
in democracy.
152 The United States Constitution is not a full embodiment of democracy, 
at least not in the purest sense of democracy; rather, it is more accurately a republican 
form of government.  In terms of democracy, the United States model and its constitution 
provides for indirect, as oppose to direct, democracy or representation.
153  However, the 
Chinese neo-liberal constitutional coterie fails to discern between direct and indirect 
democracy.  Nonetheless, given urgings for a United States model of constitutionalism, it 
150 Susan Newman, Comparing Courts, Comments on Washington University School of Law, Conference 
on Constitutional Courts sponsored by the Institute for Global Legal Studies, held November 1-3, 2001, 
available at http://law.wustl.edu/Geninfo/Magazine/ Sp2002/03_comparing_courts.pdf. 
151 Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America,
76 N.Y.L.Rev. 1, 16 (April 2001). 
152 Bookchin, Murray, New Perspective in Libertarian Thought, Vol. 1, No. 5 Comment April 15, 1980, 
available at  http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/commentv1_5.html. 
153 Abrams, Elliott, (ed.) Democracy: How Direct? Views from the Founding era and Polling era, Altamira 
Pr; (October 2002), at Elliott Abrams, Preface. 
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is reasonable to deduce that the neo-liberal coterie urges an indirect democracy, as 
oppose to direct democracy for China. 
  In August of 2000, the Ethics and Public Policy Center convenes a conference to 
examine a two-century-old debate concerning direct and indirect democracy, and its 
contemporary ramifications.
154  The elemental concerns of this conference follow. 
Given the Founders’ beliefs, our representative political institutions, 
modern telecommunications technology, and the current understandings of 
the American people about democracy and public opinion, does direct 
democracy or representation better reflect public opinion?  Do we see 
today, in this profusion of initiatives and referendums at the state level, a 
flowering of direct democracy?  A failure of state governments to 
represent voters’ views on critical issues?
155 
An on going debate over direct as oppose to indirect democracy appears to be a fixture of 
United States political culture.  The Founding Fathers wanted calm deliberation rather 
than passion in the handling of public affairs.  Hamilton’s greatest fear is "the turbulence 
and follies of democracy."  Madison calls for "the total exclusion of the people in their 
collective capacity" from governing, and the founding fathers, the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution, agree that the very democratic state governments are ineffective.   
Comparatively, state constitutions of the U.S. grant greater degrees of direct democracy 
than that of the U.S. constitution; i.e. voter referendums, recalls, initiatives, and town 
meetings.
156 
Nonetheless, a Chinese neo-liberal constitutional coterie demands democracy, or 
perhaps indirect democracy, now.
157  However, the pursuit of pure democracy remains an 
154 Id., at Preface. 
155 Id.
156 Id., at Preface. 
157 Gunde, supra note 4. 
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exercise in futility, because Western societies that embody democracy in its purest form 
are non-existent, the United States Constitution, inclusive.   
  As regards direct and indirect democracy, an additional concern is whether the 
neo-liberal coterie has considered traditional Chinese government as a historic source of 
democracy in China.  Although not resembling democracy in its purest form, as also true 
of Western liberal democratic governments, there are arguably traces of history in 
traditional Chinese government and traditional Chinese political theory that evidence 
vestiges of democratic government.  In China, democracy in its purest form, that is, direct 
government by all the people concerned, remains an impractical idea, which also holds 
true for early colonial and modern America.  
  There are similarities between representation in modern Western democratic 
governments and traditional Chinese history.  In China, a group or class of people, such 
as intellectuals who serve as representatives of a majoritarian interest, usually conduct 
actual governing.  Analogously, the same holds true for both traditional and modern 
Chinese government, because communists even advocate government should be 
conducted exclusively a by group or class of people, or proletariat class.  Although 
democracy in its purest form remains an ideal, representative democracy, arguably, is a 
reality in both modern Western democratic governments and traditional Chinese 
government.  Traditional political theory in China requires scholars prepare for 
governmental service by thorough study of the work of sages and by diligently practicing 
Confucian principles.  In this context, or pursuant to Chinese traditional political theory, 
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the opinions of scholars are assumedly representative of well though-out intelligent 
opinions of the general populace.
158 
In terms of indirect democracy, there are other similarities between Chinese 
traditional government and U.S. constitutionalism.  Under a democratic form of 
government such as the U.S., there is an equally compelling philosophical struggle 
between man and law, which arguably shares an academic kinship to scholarly discourses 
grounded in the debate between Confucianism and Legalism.
159  One can draw a 
correlative argument in similarity when one collimates the U.S. judicial selection process 
with traditional Chinese political theory.  The U.S. judiciary selection process for 
appointment of justices to the U.S. Supreme Court exhibits a proclivity towards selection 
of the sort of wise and benevolent man sought after under the principles of 
Confucianism.
160  Girardeau A. Spann in consideration of what he deems to be a 
socialized judiciary writes the following. 
Judges, of course, are not selected at random.  However, the judicial 
selection procedures that we customarily utilize may exacerbate matters 
by effectively making judges more majoritarian than if they were selected 
at random.  For reasons of checks and balances, federal judges are selected 
through a process that is intentionally political.  They are appointed by the 
most majoritarian official in the government and confirmed by the upper 
house of the legislature after public hearings in which their political 
preferences are thoroughly explored.  Although judicial temperament and 
legal competence play some role in the appointment and confirmation 
process, the acceptability of a candidate’s political inclinations is likely to 
be dispositive at both stages.  . . .  The political nature of our judicial 
selection procedures has the effect of reducing the range of attitudes that 
will be reflected in our judicial population.  Only mainstream political 
preferences will survive the appointment and confirmation process.
161 
158 Qian Mu, supra note 114, at 125. 
159 Funk, supra note 141. 
160 Cai Xiqin (transl.), Analects of Confucius, Beijing: Sinolingua (1994). 
161 Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Court, The Supreme Court and Minorities in Contemporary 
America, New York University Press 1993, at 21. 
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This phenomenon is blatant in the refusal of United State Senate to confirm 
President Ronald Reagan’s Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork.   
Comparatively, Douglas Ginsberg, the successor to Judge Bork, withdrew his nomination, 
because past recreational drug use was not within the mainstream of contemporary 
America.  In marked contrast, the nomination of now presiding Justice Clarence Thomas 
is not outside of mainstream American views, because of recreational drug use.
162 
It is also arguably that there is evidence of sovereignty in China, in the Western 
sense of sovereignty.  Historically, given the vast size of China, it is a practical 
impossibility to vest political power and authority in the hands of one person.  It is for 
this reason political power and authority vest with a collective rule of a large number of 
persons, as oppose to the practical constraints of a single ruler struggling to maintain 
control over a vast China.  In an analogy, modern Communist and Western countries 
evidence rule by groups of persons.
163  As previously mentioned, for China, this 
historically means that a group of persons, such as intellectuals who serve as 
representatives of a majoritarian interest, usually conducts actual governing.  Chinese 
traditional political theory requires rigorous preparation for governmental service, and the 
opinions of these scholars after entering public service, are assumedly representative of 
well though-out intelligent opinions of the general populace.
164  In this context, Chinese 
traditional political theory evidences a history of both sovereignty and indirect 
democracy, in the Western sense of sovereignty and indirect democracy. 
In terms of a sovereignty representative of an electorate, the same analogy holds 
true.  Direct democracy is not in place in modern China or Western countries.  In both 
162 Id., at 180.   
163 Qian Mu, supra note 114, at 122-23. 
164 Id., at 125. 
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China and Western countries, the primary concern is selecting the best persons to serve in 
government.  In Western countries, there is an emphasis on popular elections for public 
office.  In traditional China, the same goal pursued by Western countries via elections, is 
undertaken by public offices that are open to the general public through an examination 
system.
165  Comparatively, in modern China, one does witness the advent of direct 
popular vote for local electorate, a county level people’s congress, by enactment of the 
Organic Law of Village Committees of China (Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Gou Cun 
Min Wei Yuan Hui Zu Zhi Fa).
166 
E.  A Neo-liberal Constitution for China 
  The issue of transplanting liberal constitutionalism in China resolves to a question 
of the ability to integrate Western models and taxonomies with Chinese institutions.   
Practically speaking, and more accurately stated, it may simply be a question of whether 
China will become what Boaventura de Santos describes as “the successful globalization 
of a given localizm.”
167  In this context, localizm pertains to China’s ontological base in 
tradition (Confucianism).   
The viability of Western classical liberalism in modern China is contingent on 
liberalism divorcing itself from its historic excesses and abuses,
168 which weighs against 
its successful transplant in modern China, because China’s ontological base in tradition 
arguably stands as a ubiquitous barrier to Western liberalism.  Moreover, in terms of the 
liberalism of John Rawls, the success of liberal constitutionalism is contingent on a social 
165 Id.
166 Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Gou Cun Min Wei Yuan Hui Zu Zhi Fa (Organic Law of the Villagers 
Committees of the People’s Republic of China), Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Ninth NPC on 
November 4, 1998.  
167 Boaventura de Santos, Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in Paradigmatic 
Transition, 262 (1995).  
168 Therrien, supra note 20. 
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unity and concord that requires agreement on a general and comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine.  Timothy Samuel Shah summarizes the Rawlsian 
analysis on liberalism’s inherent conflict with diversity and uncommon religious beliefs, 
as viewing containment of religious pluralism and diversity as necessary to its success, 
and writes, 
Rawls thus demonstrates his agreement with Grotius (as well as Rousseau, 
interestingly) that certain religious beliefs stand in the way of liberalism 
and, whether by direct persuasion or gradual attenuation, have to be 
overcome “to clear the way for liberal institutions.”  Note that Rawls's 
example is not of a belief that is political as such or in any definite way 
runs counter to liberal ideals: contra Rawls (and Rousseau, whom he is 
implicitly following here), it hardly follows from one's believing in the 
doctrine of eternal damnation that one can be expected to molest, harass, 
or coerce, or in any way fail to cooperate politically with, those one 
supposes will be damned.  Embedded in Rawls's historical account is 
evidently a set of psychological and sociological assumptions about the 
relationship between religious belief and political behavior, according to 
which some religious beliefs are considered congruent with liberal 
citizenship, others not.  This set of assumptions leads Rawls to conclude 
that there is a conflict, perhaps absolute—note the phrase “if not 
impossible” above—between a traditional and not uncommon religious 
belief (damnation), on the one hand, and liberal citizenship, on the 
other.
169 
Shah more clearly states his cases as follows, “Rawls believes that the 
disappearance or attenuation of some religious beliefs was good and even necessary for 
liberalism.”
170  Shah’s view of Rawlsianism perceives Rawls as anticipating Grotius’s 
theory of overlapping consensus as a creative solution to the liberal problem.  The abuse 
of this creative solution, or Rawlsian analysis, is that its success is contingent on 
constraining diversity and religious pluralism.
171 
169 Elliott Abrams, (ed.), Democracy: How Direct? Views from the Founding era and Polling era, Altamira 
Pr; (October 2002), at Timothy Samuel Shah, Making the Christian World Safe for Liberalism.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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The issue of transplanting neo-liberal constitutionalism may turn on definitional 
meanings.  Political liberalism supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine will 
not reject the essentials of a democratic regime.  In a world divorced from the 
existentiality of China citizenry, arguably, China’s ontological base in tradition 
(Confucianism) will only survive an inevitable conflict with liberalism if it can be 
contained within the confines of what Rawls deems the democratic essentials, which are 
burdens of judgment that displace firm religious faith.
172  Issues of blending liberalism 
and Confucianism, ultimately, resolve to two issues.  Is liberalism’s center of gravity a 
set of purely political principles and institutions formulated and justified independently of 
moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines?  Is Confucianism, like Grotius’s proposed 
reduction of Christian dogmas to those necessary for ethics,
173  amendable to a reduction 
to Western ethos?  
In terms of scrutinizing Chinese constitutional ethos, assuming a neo-liberal 
constitutional coterie recognizes a need for constitutional ethos, one must necessarily be 
wary of aquarianism or the trap of a discourse perceiving such ethos as if they were 
motionless, static, compartmentalized, and even predictable.
174  Nonetheless, a discourse 
in constitutional ethos cannot ignore the existentiality of a Chinese citizenry, and like 
wise, it cannot proceed in a void divorced from the reality of an ontological base in 
tradition (Confucianism).   
The issue may simply resolve to one of a purposeful choice, which is reflexive of 
societal morals and values, for China’s polity or citizenry, because, arguably, a sine qua 
172 Id.
173 Id.
174  See  Henry Giroux and David Purpel, (eds.), The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education,
Paul Freire, The Banking Concept of Education, Berkeley: McCutcheon Publishing (1983), at 283. 
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non of a successful resolve of these competing institutions is conflict.  Choice is 
ultimately the critical basis of values, in that,   “Value implies a code or a standard which 
has some persistence through time, or, more broadly put, which organizes a system of 
action.  Value, conveniently and in accordance with the received usage, places things, 
acts, ways of behaving, and goals of action on the approval-disapproval continuum.”
175 
IV. POST-TIANANMEN SQUARE AND LIBERALISM 
Tiananmen for a China citizenry is the quintessential symbol of China, and, 
arguably, serves as an inexplicable link for groups and factions advocating a new 
democracy for China, such as neo-liberalism, pro-democracy, teledemocracy, cyber-
democracy, and others.
176  The tragedy surrounding June 4, 1989, or the democracy 
movement and Tiananmen Square,
177 is also a commonality, and seemingly inexplicable 
link, among the Chinese neo-liberal coterie.
178  The tragedy at Tiananmen Square 
represents the closing in a chapter of the pro-democracy movement.  The historian J. A. 
G. Roberts writes,  
In broader terms the tragic events of 3-4 June 1989 have been explained as 
a failure of China’s political system.  The economic reforms which began 
in 1978 might have been accompanied by the development of institutions 
which would have promoted further grounds for dispute between 
reformers and conservatives.  Because of this rift there was no agreement 
within the leadership on how to deal with the democracy movement, and 
policy see-sawed between concession and violent suppression.
179 
In 1992, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square tragedy, the Fifth Session of 
the Fifth National People’s Congress (“NPC”) affirms Deng Xiaoping’s Four Cardinal 
175 See Barrett, Donald M., (ed.), Values in America, William L. Koib, Values Determinism and Abstraction,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press (1961), at 52.
176 Killion, supra note 50. 
177 See J.A.G. Roberts, A Concise History of China, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
1999, at 298. 
178 Gunde, supra note 4. 
179 Roberts, supra note 177, at 298-99.  
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Principles (Si Xiang Ji Ben Yuan Ze),
 180  and China adopts a policy of a socialist market 
economy,
 181  which signals the end of price controls and encourages development of 
private enterprise.
182  The NPC adds the words, “developing a socialist market economy,” 
to the preamble of the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Zhong Hua 
Ren Min Gong He Guo Xian Fa),
 183 which elevates these words to constitutional stature.  
This constitutional amendment is important, because of its relation to both the tragedy of 
June 4, 1989, or Tiananmen Square,
184  and China’s 2002 election of the National 
People’s Congress (“NPC”).  On November 16, 2002, there is a changing of the guard, 
and its new leadership, in ranking order, is Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia 
Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan.
185  It 
is the hope of the new leadership, as they headed towards the January election of the 
Tenth NPC
186 and the March 2003 Tenth NPC,
187 to avoid another Tiananmen Square 
tragedy.
188  Because of post-Tiananmen sentiment, changing of guard, post-WTO reforms, 
and other reasons, the Tenth NPC will arguably represent a watershed event in the history 
of China. 
180 Id.
181   Jian Yang, Book Review: China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition, New Zealand 
International Review, July-August 2002 v27 i4 p29(3), (Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: The 
Politics of Transition, Cambridge University Press 2001), available at   
http:// www.nziia.auckland.ac.nz/docs/Yang-5.doc. 
182 Roberts, supra note 177, at 299. 
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People’s Republic of China), Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 
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186  China Internet Information Center, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, available  at 
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187 Id.
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  In 1989, an anonymous student at Tiananmen Square proclaims, “I don't know 
exactly what democracy is, but we need more of it.”
 189  One ponders whether the new 
vanguard truly understands democracy, constitutionalism, and independent judicial 
review, because historic excesses, abuses, and conflicts of liberalism serve as arguable 
impediments to the transplant or integration of neo-liberalism in China.  In light of the 
February 21, 2003 symposium of Chinese neo-liberals, several thoughts come to mind.  
The words of the anonymous Chinese Student, in Beijing of 1989,
190 may speak to a 
problem of advocacy for democratic change in China.  Nonetheless, the protest at 
Tiananmen Square is rightly described as a tragedy.  There is little excuse for the 
violence, deaths estimated at 400 to 800 people,
191 and political retributions, especially of 
the variety the panelist are forced to endure, that succeed this tragedy.
192 
The events at Tiananmen Square speak to a lack of consistency in purpose and 
goal, if not ideology, in this historic protest.  A history of Tiananmen Square reveals 
seemingly diverse purposes and ideology as the foundation for the tragedy of 1989.   
J.A.G. Roberts aptly describes the diversity in people and ideology of the protestors and 
writes, 
At first this was not primarily a movement of intellectuals, its main 
participants being state-employed manual workers and technicians, who 
later joined by former Red Guards who had drifted back to the cities.  The 
first manifestation of the movement was the appearance of posters on a 
wall along Chang’an Avenue in Beijing.  Among the contributions was a 
poster headed ‘Democracy, the Fifth Modernization’ by Wei Jingsheng, a 
man in his forties who worked as an electrician at Beijing Zoo while at the 
same time studying at Beijing University.  Wei Jingsheng argued that free 
enterprise was the only economic system compatible with democracy.   
Other contributors to the democracy movement remained committed to 
189 Supra note 1. 
190 Id.
191 Roberts, supra note 177, at 298. 
192 Gunde, supra note 4. 
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socialism and argued that China’s problems stemmed from the 
shortcomings of its bureaucracy.
193 
The anonymous Chinese student seeks democracy, but knows not its true meaning.  
The anonymous student, who does not know what democracy is, still participates, while, 
yet, lacking a foundational understanding of democracy and its implications for Chinese 
society.
194  All of which leads one to ponder the rightness of Chinese neo-liberalism as a 
cure-all for modern China and question whether those who urge Chinese neo-liberalism 
equally know the true meaning of democracy and its implications for modern China.   
  A historicity of Western classical liberalism stems from a search for alternative 
governmental form to replace the political authority of Christianity, which when 
undermined had to be replaced.  The theological-political problem is the name that Pierre 
Manent gives to the question of the political role of revealed religion, being 
Christianity.
195  Moreover, Manent identifies Thomas Hobbes as the father of classical 
liberalism, the champion of absolute political authority, and as the founding and 
paradigmatic liberal.
196  Contrarily, Manent notes that modern liberals, while very ready 
to accept this unflattering and one-dimensional portrait of Thomas Hobbes, generally 
deny that Hobbes is any sort of liberal at all.
197  The latter illustrates a problem of modern 
liberals in understanding liberalism in its purest sense, or its historic essence, and further 
leads one to question the rightness of Chinese neo-liberalism as a proper course for 
reform in China. 
193 Roberts, supra note 177, at 296. 
194 Supra note 1. 
195 Manet, supra note 147. 
196 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XIV of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts (1651), 
available at http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/hobbes/leviathan.html. 
197 Manet, supra note 147. 
43 Killion: China and Neo-liberal Constitutionalism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 200344
  A question of clarity in thought, purpose, and ideology, in terms of neo-liberalism, 
reminds one of the words of the late eminent scholar Qian Mu (Ch’ien Mu) (1895-1990), 
a translation follows. 
Today, we seem to take an experimental attitude toward whatever system 
we happen to know of.  We must remember, however, that if we 
experiment with a theory or a system which has been initiated by a 
handful of people or has been practiced merely for a short time in other 
countries, without establishing confidence among the people, the 
consequences of such experimentation will be very unpredictable.  It is 
impossible to build up a political system without concern for the traditions 
of a country.  For, if we insist that Chinese history be rewritten and the 
society overhauled, then we will have confused political systems with 
revolutions, and shouted ‘down with the past!’ without paying due respect 
to historical facts.  If this were to happen, we would not be changing 
government or institutions and reforming society but would be tearing to 
pieces all of Chinese culture.  Because of this interrelationship, no 
conclusions on any theory can be drawn without careful considerations or 
long experimentation.
198 
The words of Qian Mu begs one to question of the rightness of Chinese neo-
liberalism for modern China, or any other alternative political economic theories that may 
threaten the very fabric of Chinese culture.  In light of the words of Qian Mu, and his 
hope of preserving Chinese history and culture amidst political experimentation, one 
hopes that a Chinese neo-liberal coterie engages a discourse in neo-liberalism in earnest, 
as oppose to the seduction of intellectual fashion.
199  It is the same hope that one has for 
other pro-democracy movements, such as The New York Society, and other vanguard 
teledemocracy and cyber-democracy forms of protest.
200  It is a hope of sincerity in effort 
and recognition of a reality that change in any polity is a serious venture, especially for a 
modern China amidst on-going legal reforms and economic development.  For China, a 
198 Qian Mu, supra note 114, at 142. 
199 Eisuke Suzuki, Deputy General Counsel of the Asian Development Bank, Building freedom of trade on 
basis of fairness, March 19, 2002, citing Business Weekly, March 19, 2002, available  at 
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/bw/2002-03-12/61647.html. 
200 Supra notes 58-63. 
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need for stability results in a steady, yet gradual, approach to modernity, lest China suffer 
setbacks in its reforms and development.
201 
V. CONCLUSION 
A failure of Western liberal constitutionalism in the nation-states of Africa, 
Russia, and other nation-states,
202 warrants serious consideration.  A neo-liberal coterie 
desiderates a constitution that mirrors a United States Constitution, which they deem a 
model liberal constitution.  However, a vision of a China polity under a pragmatic neo-
liberal regime begs the question of how a Chinese neo-liberal coterie will define a source 
of order that will enable neo-liberal constitutionalism to work.  In this context, until 
liberalism, neo-liberalism, or pragmatic neo-liberalism, rids itself of its historic excesses 
and abuses, China’s ontological base in tradition (Confucianism) will arguably remain a 
ubiquitous barrier to invocation of Western pragmatic neo-liberal constitutionalism and 
juris prudential in modernity. 
A successful transplant of Western neo-liberalism necessitates a regime of juris 
prudential in modernity, because neo-liberalism, a handmaiden of globalization, arguably 
requires a statist regime
203 for purposes of confusing China’s ontological base in tradition 
(Confucianism) with Western values and globalizing a given localizm, being China.  A 
problem of Western neo-liberalism is its contingency on Western juris prudential in 
modernity, as oppose to a neglected Western historical jurisprudence.  Neo-liberals in a 
quest to transplant a United States model of separation of powers and independent 
judicial review ignore the more viable alternative for transplanting a Western 
constitutional design in China, which is the nationalist historicism of historical 
201 Killion, supra note 50. 
202 Dryzek, supra note 49. 
203 Murray Bookchin, New Perspective in Libertarian Thought, vol. 1, no. 5 Comment (April 15, 1980). 
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jurisprudence.  Arguably, for a China polity, a more viable alternative of Western 
historical jurisprudence and nationalist historicism could serve as a check against the 
arbitrary exercise of power and provide a juris prudential allowing for a more 
independent judiciary, in the sense of Western constitutionalism, as oppose to Western 
pragmatic neo-liberalism and juris prudential in modernity.  Western historical 
jurisprudence presents a more viable alternative, because it will arguably recognize a 
traditional Chinese jurisprudence evolving amidst on-going legal reforms and economic 
development, which is reflective of the particularity of China’s ontological base in 
tradition (Confucianism).
204 
On modernizing China, former President Jiang Zemin stresses the importance of 
morality (Confucianism), the core of Chinese culture, as governing every aspect of 
national life. 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin recently stressed that, in the process of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics and developing a socialist 
market economy, the nation needed to unremittingly strengthen socialist 
legal system construction, and ensure China was a country ruled by law.  
At the same time, every Chinese should untiringly strengthen socialist 
morality construction and ensure that morality governed every part of 
national life.
205 
There are similarities and dissimilarities in the respective culture and values of the 
West and China, all of which serves as source of policy contentions in Sinic-West 
relations.  The nomenclature of neo-liberalism exemplifies problem of cultural 
divergence and equally biased cultural perceptions in Sinic-West relations, because 
204 Michel Foucault, Paul Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, Random House (April 1984), at 50,”The 
critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a 
permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating: it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of 
the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.” 
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liberalism, and its variants, serves as a source of policy contention in Sinic-West relations.  
Samuel Huntington contends that the post-Cold war world will divide into civilizations 
marked by fundamental cultural differences.
206  Notwithstanding a need for fairness and 
objectivity in multilateral policies and relations, cultural divergence influences genuine 
discourses in legal reforms, economic development, and especially liberal democratic 
constitutional reforms. 
Contrarily, neo-liberal constitutionalists proffer a prophecy of post-cold war 
civilizations that are predominately neo-liberal governments, which, ultimately, manifest 
liberal democratic political constitutions.  There are several problems with this contention. 
First, such prophecy bears striking resemblance to an earlier thesis of Francis 
Fukuyama, which has yet to materialize, that history is at an end, in that post-cold war 
civilizations will naturally evolve to liberal democratic governments.
207  In terms of 
China, a problem of Fukuyama’s prophecy is China’s historical particularity and 
ontological base in tradition (Confucianism).  In this respect, China serves as a reminder 
that history is not at an end, in that China, and its Sinic uniqueness, challenges a new 
world order shrouded in Western culture and taxonomies. 
Secondly, a post-cold war history evidences a contrary historicism of neo-
liberalism.  Neo-liberals deny a post-cold war, directional historicism of world 
constitutionalism.  There are many who advocate that United States Constitutionalism, 
and its concepts of popular sovereignty, separation of powers and independent judicial 
206 Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: 
Simon and Schuster (1966). 
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review, in the post-cold war era serves as a model for world constitutionalism,
208 a 
contention, no doubt, shared by neo-liberal constitutionalists.  However, a reality of 
world constitutionalism is constitution-writing nation states adopting variants attributable 
to cultural and economic forces.  A latter result attributable to recent failures of 
developing nation-states attempting to adopt a United State Constitutional model, or 
liberal constitutional political economy design, such as the failures of Russia, British ex-
colonies in Africa, and other nation-states, intending to promote a Western market system.  
A further justification for constitution writing nation-states to develop variants, or what 
Heinz Klug refers to as anti-models,
209  of a U.S. Constitutional model is empirical 
evidence intimating that we can get similar outcomes across constitutionalized and non-
constitutionalized situations.
210 
Differing interpretations, subject to forces of culture and economics, of what 
constitutes liberalism, neo-liberalism or pragmatic liberalism, are demonstrative of 
problems in cultural divergence, which, ultimately, affects, albeit indirectly, genuine 
discourses in multilateralism, rule of law and constitutionalism.  In terms of China and 
cultural divergence, the most serious flaw of neo-liberal constitutionalism is a proposed 
invocation of Western universal cosmopolitanism, or Western values and norms, as a 
source of constitutional ethos for Chinese constitutionalism.  For China, Confucianism 
and China’s ontological base in tradition, as oppose to Western universal values, provide 
the only genuinely viable source of constitutional ethos for Chinese constitutionalism. 
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